LINGUISTIC INTUITION AND PHONOLOGICAL DATA

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In this paper, it is shown that intuitive linguistic judgments are in fact used as a source of phonological data and that these judgments are no different in kind from those used in syntax and semantics. It is argued that given the goal (endorsed by all generative linguists) of characterizing rules which actually govern speech (and which spekers tacitly know) intuitive judgments are indispensable (even in principle) as data for evaluating phonological theories. These considerations suggest that, despite linguists' apparent lack of concern with understanding the use of intuitive data in phonology, recent discussions of the nature of linguistic intuition, of the scientific legitimacy of using linguistic intuition as data, of the epistemic status of theories in whose evaluation intuitive judgments play a significant part, and of methodologies appropriate for assessing the relative reliability of conflicting intuitive linguistic judgments (and of speech and judgments which are in conflict) are as relevant to the conceptual and methodological foundations of generative phonology as they are to generative syntax and semantics.