

# Semantic Theory

## Week 10 – Distributional Formal Semantics


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Harm Brouwer

Universität des Saarlandes

Summer 2022

# The Greatest Semanticist of them all ...



- > Our language comprehension system is highly effective and accurate at attributing meaning to unfolding linguistic signal (~word-by-word)
- >> This system's representations and computational principles are implemented in the neural hardware of the brain
- >>> We should understand meaning construction and representation in terms of "brain-style computation"

# A shopping list

**Neural Plausibility:** assumed representations and computational principles should be implementable at the neural level [cf. Rumelhart, 1989]

**Expressivity:** representations should capture necessary dimensions of meaning, such as negation, quantification, and modality [cf. Frege, 1892]

**Compositionality:** the meaning of complex expressions should be derivable from the meaning of its parts [cf. Partee, 1984]

**Gradedness:** meaning representations are probabilistic, rather than discrete in nature [cf. Spivey, 2008]

**Inferential:** The derivation of utterance meaning entails (direct) inferences that go beyond literal propositional content [cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983]

**Incrementality:** As natural language unfolds over time, representations should allow for incremental construction [cf. Tanenhaus et al., 1995]

# Distributional Semantics

“How much do we know at any time? Much more, or so I believe, than we know we know!”

— Agatha Christie, *The Moving Finger* (1942)

“You shall know a word by the company it keeps”

— J. R. Firth (1957)

Psychological Review  
1997, Vol. 104, No. 2, 211–240

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0033-295X/97/\$3.00

## A Solution to Plato’s Problem: The Latent Semantic Analysis Theory of Acquisition, Induction, and Representation of Knowledge

Thomas K Landauer  
University of Colorado at Boulder

Susan T. Dumais  
Bellcore

# Distributional Semantics (cont'd)

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How much wood would a woodchuck chuck ,  
 if a woodchuck could chuck wood ?  
 As much wood as a woodchuck would ,  
 if a woodchuck could chuck wood .

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	<b>a</b>	<b>as</b>	<b>chuck</b>	<b>could</b>	<b>how</b>	<b>if</b>	<b>much</b>	<b>wood</b>	<b>woodch.</b>	<b>would</b>	,	.	?
<b>a</b>	0	5	9	6	1	10	4	8	18	9	10	0	0
<b>as</b>	5	4	2	1	0	0	7	10	3	2	1	0	5
<b>chuck</b>	9	2	0	8	0	5	1	9	11	2	4	3	3
<b>could</b>	6	1	8	0	0	4	0	6	8	0	2	2	2
<b>how</b>	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	0	2	0	0	0
<b>if</b>	10	0	5	4	0	0	0	0	10	3	8	0	0
<b>much</b>	4	7	1	0	4	0	0	10	2	3	0	0	3
<b>wood</b>	8	10	9	6	3	0	10	2	8	5	0	4	6
<b>woodch.</b>	18	3	11	8	0	10	2	8	0	8	10	1	1
<b>would</b>	9	2	2	0	2	3	3	5	8	0	5	0	0
,	10	1	4	2	0	8	0	0	10	5	0	0	0
.	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	0
?	0	5	3	2	0	0	3	6	1	0	0	0	0

(4-word ramped window: 1 2 3 4 [0] 4 3 2 1)

# Distributional Semantics (cont'd)

$$\text{similarity} = \cos(\theta) = \frac{\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{B}}{\|\mathbf{A}\| \|\mathbf{B}\|} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n A_i B_i}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n A_i^2} \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n B_i^2}}$$

Ranging from dissimilar (0) to similar (1) — e.g., similarity(wood, woodchuck) = .6

- > **Neurally plausible** and **Graded lexical** representations
- > But what about **Compositionality, Expressivity and Inference?**

Queen = King - Man?

X is not a queen = ???

X is queen  $\models$  X is not a man

Some queens are rich = ???

- Distributional Semantics lacks the logical capacity of Formal Semantics  
(but is still highly suitable for modelling lexical semantic memory!)

# Distributional Formal Semantics

*Noortje Venhuizen*

*Petra Hendriks*

*Matthew Crocker*

*Harm Brouwer*



# NATURAL LANGUAGE SEMANTICS

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## Model-theoretic Semantics

- Truth-conditional meaning
- Logical entailment
- Compositionality

## Distributional Semantics

- Semantic similarity
- Empirically driven
- Cognitively inspired

?


E.g., Baroni *et al.* (2010,2014); Boleda & Herbelot (2016); Coecke *et al.* (2010); Grefenstette & Sadrzadeh (2011); Socher *et al.* (2012)

# A FRAMEWORK FOR DISTRIBUTIONAL FORMAL SEMANTICS


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
A meaning space for Distributional Formal Semantics



Formal properties of the meaning space




Incremental meaning construction




Semantic processing in the meaning space

# A MEANING SPACE FOR DISTRIBUTIONAL FORMAL SEMANTICS



# FROM MODELS TO MEANING SPACE

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...

$$M_1 = \langle U_1, V_1 \rangle$$

$$p_1 \wedge \neg p_2 \wedge p_3 \wedge \dots$$

$$M_2 = \langle U_2, V_2 \rangle$$

$$\neg p_1 \wedge p_2 \wedge p_3 \wedge \dots$$

$$M_3 = \langle U_3, V_3 \rangle$$

$$\neg p_1 \wedge p_2 \wedge \neg p_3 \wedge \dots$$

$$M_n = \langle U_n, V_n \rangle$$

$$\neg p_1 \wedge \neg p_2 \wedge \neg p_3 \wedge \dots$$

- The set of models  $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{P}}$  — describing states-of-affairs over propositions in  $\mathcal{P}$  — defines a meaning space
- Propositional meaning defined by co-occurrence across models

# CAPTURING THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD

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*“A boy rides a bike”*

*Boy is (likely) outside*

*Boy is not asleep*

*If it’s evening, the light is on*

*The bike has wheels*

*etc.*



World knowledge restricts propositional co-occurrence in the meaning space derived from the set of models  $\mathcal{M}_P$

- Hard world knowledge constraints restrict individual models
- Probabilistic constraints define probabilistic co-occurrences across the set of models  $\mathcal{M}_P$

# DFS MEANING SPACE $S_{\mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{P}}$

*propositional meaning vectors*

	$p_1$	$p_2$	$p_3$	$p_4$	$\vdots$
$M_1$	1	1	0	0	...
$M_2$	1	0	0	1	...
$M_3$	0	1	0	1	...
$M_4$	1	1	1	1	...
$M_5$	0	1	0	0	...
...	...	...	...	...	...

$$[\![p_j]\!]^{\mathcal{M}} := v(p_j)$$

where:  $v_i(p_j) = 1$  iff  $M_i \models p_j$

- **Incremental inference-based probabilistic sampling:** Based on a set of propositions  $\mathcal{P}$ , we sample a set of models  $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{P}}$ —taking into account hard and probabilistic world knowledge constraints
- **Co-occurrence defines meaning:** Propositions with related meanings are true in many of the same models, resulting in similar meaning vectors

# THE DISTRIBUTIONAL HYPOTHESIS REVISITED

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“

You shall know a word  
by the company it keeps

- *J. R. Firth (1957)*

# THE DISTRIBUTIONAL HYPOTHESIS REVISITED


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“

You shall know a ~~word~~ *proposition*  
by the company it keeps

- J. R. Firth (1957)

# FORMAL PROPERTIES OF THE MEANING SPACE



# MEANING VECTOR COMPOSITION

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Meaning vectors can be combined to define compositional meanings

- Standard logical operators interpreted as in model-theory

$$v_i(\neg p) = 1 \quad \text{iff } M_i \not\models p$$

$$v_i(p \wedge q) = 1 \quad \text{iff } M_i \models p \text{ and } M_i \models q$$

... etc.

- Quantification is defined relative to the combined universe of  $\mathcal{M}_P$ :  $\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{M}} = \{e_1 \dots e_m\}$  (thereby preserving entailment in  $\mathcal{M}_P$ )

$$v_i(\forall x \varphi) = 1 \quad \text{iff } M_i \models \varphi[x|e_1] \wedge \dots \wedge \varphi[x|e_m]$$

$$v_i(\exists x \varphi) = 1 \quad \text{iff } M_i \models \varphi[x|e_1] \vee \dots \vee \varphi[x|e_m]$$

# PROBABILITIES IN THE MEANING SPACE

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All (sub-)propositional meaning vectors inherently encode (co-)occurrence probabilities

- Prior probability of meaning vector  $a$

$$P(a) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|} \sum_i \vec{v}_i(a)$$

- Conjunction probability between  $a$  and  $b$

$$P(a \wedge b) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|} \sum_i \vec{v}_i(a) \vec{v}_i(b)$$

- Conditional probability of  $a$  given  $b$

$$P(a|b) = \frac{P(a \wedge b)}{P(b)}$$

	$p_1$	$p_2$	$p_3$	$p_4$	
$M_1$	1	1	0	0	...
$M_2$	1	0	0	1	...
$M_3$	0	1	0	1	...
$M_4$	1	1	1	1	...
	0	1	0	0	...
	...	...	...	...	...

# QUANTIFYING PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE

---

Probabilistic logical inference of meaning vector  $a$  given  $b$

$$\text{inference}(a,b) = \begin{cases} [P(a|b) - P(a)] / [1 - P(a)] & \text{if } P(a|b) > P(a) \\ [P(a|b) - P(a)] / P(a) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


- $P(a|b) > P(a)$ : Positive inference ( $b$  increases probability of  $a$ )

$$\text{inference}(a,b) = 1 \Leftrightarrow b \vDash a$$

- $P(a|b) \leq P(a)$ : Negative inference ( $b$  decreases probability of  $a$ )

$$\text{inference}(a,b) = -1 \Leftrightarrow b \vDash \neg a$$

# CONTINUOUS NATURE OF THE MEANING SPACE



- Each point in the meaning space can be interpreted relative to  $\mathcal{M}_P$ 
  - Binary vectors: propositional meanings (simple or complex)
  - Real-valued vectors: sub-propositional meanings
- Sub-propositional meaning derives from incremental mapping from (sequences of) words to proposition-level meanings

# SAMPLING

## Incremental propositional logic (Light World)

- a propositional formula  $p$  is added to the Light World
- $p$  is a proposition
- additional propositions are added
- if  $p$  cannot be derived from the Light World

```
tmux
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2017-2020 Harm Brouwer <me@hbrouwer.eu>
3 * and Noortje Venhuizen <njvenhuizen@gmail.com>
4 *
5 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
6 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
7 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
8 *
9 *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
10 *
11 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
12 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
13 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
14 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
15 * limitations under the License.
16 */
17 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%
18 % "Link, it is I, Sahasrahla. I am communicating to you across the void %
19 % through telepathy... The place where you now stand was the Golden Land, %
20 % but evil power turned it into the Dark World. The wizard has broken the %
21 % wise men's seal and opened a gate to link the worlds at Hyrule Castle. %
22 % In order to save this half of the world, the Light World, you must win %
23 % back the Golden Power."
24 % – Sahasrahla
25 %
26 %
27 % From: The Legend of Zelda: A Link to the Past (1992)
28 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%
29
30 :- module(dfs_sampling,
31           [
32             op(900,fx, @+),      %% constant
33             op(900,fx, @*),      %% property
34             op(900,fx, @#),      %% constraint
35             op(900,xfx,<-),      %% probability
36
37             dfs_sample_models/2,
38             dfs_sample_model/1,
39
40             dfs_sample_models_mt/3
41           ]).
42
43 :- use_module(library(debug)). % topic: dfs_sampling
44 :- use_module(library(lists)).
45 :- use_module(library(ordsets)).
46 :- use_module(library(random)).
47
48 :- use_module(dfs_interpretation).
49 :- use_module(dfs_io).
50 :- use_module(dfs_logic).
51
52 :- public
53     (@+)/1,
54     (@#)/1,
55     (@*)/1,
56     (@=)/1,
57     (@!=)/1,
58     (@>)/1,
59     (@<)/1,
60     (@>=)/1,
61     (@<=)/1,
62     (@>>)/1,
63     (@<<)/1,
64     (@>>=)/1,
65     (@<<=)/1,
66     (@>>>)/1,
67     (@<<<)/1,
68     (@>>>=)/1,
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# SAMPLING A MEANING SPACE: EXAMPLE

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Truth constraint:  $LW \models \text{All } \text{boys}_{\{\text{dustin}, \text{lucas}, \text{mike}\}} \text{ ride a bicycle}$

? *Mike rides a bicycle*



*Dustin rides a bicycle*

*Mike rides a bicycle*

*Mike rides a bicycle*

Falsehood constraint:  $DW \models \text{There is a boy that rides a bicycle}$

# SAMPLING A MEANING SPACE: EXAMPLE

---

Truth constraint:  $LW \models \text{All } \text{boys}_{\{\text{dustin}, \text{lucas}, \text{mike}\}} \text{ ride a bicycle}$

✓ *Mike rides a bicycle*




*Dustin rides a bicycle*

*Mike rides a bicycle*

Falsehood constraint:  $DW \models \text{There is a boy that rides a bicycle}$

# CONSTRUCTING THE MODEL: MEANING SPACE

We sampled a meaning space of 150 models describing 51 propositions





ELSEVIER

## Distributional forms

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## ARTICLE INFO

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*Article history:*  
Available online 5 May 2021

**Keywords:**  
Formal semantics  
Distributional semantics  
Compositionality  
Probability  
Inference  
Incrementality

## 1. Introduction

Traditional formal approaches of their logical interpretation with predicate logic [1] to event-based the notions of entailment and composition how they can be combined to form semantics, which has recently gained lexical items in a usage-based manner [7]. The main advantage of such approaches and relatedness between lexical items is proven extremely difficult to incorporate in a distributional semantic framework.

Indeed, while formal semantics on the level of words, there has been

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
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<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2021.104763>

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
# DFS Tools

# A MODEL OF INCREMENTAL MEANING CONSTRUCTION





# Comprehension scores



The higher  $B(a)$  the more difficult it is to *increase certainty* in  $a$ , and the lower  $B(a)$  the more difficult it is to *increase uncertainty* in  $a$