

More on Presuppositions

- What my group is doing...
- What I am doing...
- What could be done...

Research Objective

- develop a theoretically informed corpus-based account of the diachronic evolution of presuppositions and their triggers
- capture the information-theoretic contribution made by presuppositions and their triggers

Theoretical Background

- Diachronic extension of the **Maximize Presupposition** principle (Heim, 1991)
- **Avoid Pragmatic Overload** principle (Eckardt, 2009) as a potential upper bound
 - presuppositional satisfaction/accommodation profiles for different triggers
 - extraction of relevant features
 - Average surprisal as an additional metric (Degaetano-Ortlieb et al., 2016)

Maximize PSP

- Observation: Different presupposition triggers are obligatory when their presuppositions are met in the context.

- (1) a. #A sun is shining.
b. The sun is shining.
- (2) a. #All of John's eyes are open.
b. Both of John's eyes are open.
- (3) a. #John thinks/believes that Paris is in France.
b. John knows that Paris is in France.
- (4) John came to the store.
a. #Bill did.
b. Bill did, too.
- (5) Jenna went ice skating.
a. #Today she went ice skating.
b. Today she went ice skating, again.

Maximize PSP

- Maximize Presupposition (Heim, 1991): **Among a set of alternatives, use the felicitous sentence with the strongest presupposition.**
 - Lexical scales of presuppositional strength;
 - Alternatives are infelicitous in the same context;
 - When the weaker item on the scale is used felicitously, it gives rise to an "antipresupposition" (Percus 2006) or "implicated presupposition" (Sauerland 2008).

Maximize PSP – Extensions

- Prediction:

Situation: A speaker s utters a sentence S_1 . S_2 is an alternative sentence to S_1 ; S_2 asserts what S_1 asserts, but additionally presupposes p .

- Inference: S_2 is infelicitous, that is the constraints on its presupposition are not met.
- Additionally: Competence & Authority Assumption (Chemla, 2008)
 - Competence: The speaker is opinionated about the truth of the alternative sentence p .
 - Authority: The speaker believes that she could convince her addressee that p is true by simply uttering a sentence presupposing p .

... then p becomes common belief

(20) *Context: John sees Mary at a party. He wants to discover whether his beautiful addressee is married, but he does not want to reveal that he would prefer her to be single. John may ask:*

Didn't you come with your husband?

(21) *Context: There is a disagreement about the number 319; Mary is known to have very good mathematics skills. Someone just said that 319 is a prime number.*

- a. **No, Mary knows that it's not.*
- b. *No, it's not.*
- c. *No, Mary believes that it's not.*

Avoid Pragmatic Overload

- APO principle as an important motivation for meaning change:
 - If too much pragmatic accommodation is required to understand the meaning of a particular construction, semantic reanalysis takes place.
 - Redistribute meaning among constituents to free the respective constituent from its overload.
 - Accommodating PSP failures results in changes to the way particular expressions are interpreted.

Average Surprisal / UID

- Degetano et al. (2016):

Denser encodings for predictable, conventionalized units.

But:

- PSP trigger is highly predictable and NOT to be omitted.
- Thus: Focus on interplay between trigger and info status of PSP it introduces.
- In case of newly introduced information, i.e. without preceding given associate, the constraint to obligatorily insert a distinct trigger should be lower.

Factives – The Classics

- Karttunen (1971):

With Sentential Subjects

is { tragic
significant
relevant
odd }

bothers
matters
makes sense

With Sentential Objects

forget (that)
regret
resent
realize
make clear
find out
discover
see
notice

Factives – The Classics

- Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1968):
Sentence with factive predicate presupposes the truth of its complement.

Do they?

Factive verbs

- Certain predicates with that-clause subjects:
that S be odd/tragic (as opposed to *likely*)
that S count/matter/suffice (as opposed to *happen*)
- Certain emotive adjectives with complements:
NP be happy/glad/furious that S (as opposed to *hopeful*)
NP be sad/delighted/disappointed to VP (as opposed to *willing*)
- Certain propositional attitude verbs:
NP know/regret/forget/remember that S (as opposed to *believe*)
- Verbs of discovery:
NP discover/find out/notice/observe that S (as opposed to *suspect*)
NP be discovered/found out/noticed/observed to VP (as opposed to *suspected*)
- Certain verbs of communication: *acknowledge, admit, confess* (as opposed to *say*)





Half a century later in linguistic theory...

- Karttunen (2016):

Affirmative assertions commit the speaker to the truth of the complement but negative sentences, questions and conditionals with coming-to-know verbs are non-committal.

- a. The police did not discover that any cars had been tampered with.
- b. If the police did not discover that any cars had been tampered with, the suspects should let go.
- c. Perhaps the police will discover that some cars had been tampered with but so far they haven't.

Example: *know*



Additional Perspectives

- Psycholinguistic Perspectives
- Opinion Mining

Psycholinguistic Perspectives

- Global-first model (Chemla, 2013):
 - Local accommodation is not the easy processing option for factive verbs.

Zoologists do not realise that elephants are birds.

Global: *[Elephants are birds] and not [zoologists believe so]* (false)

Local: *NOT [(Elephants are birds) AND (zoologists believe so)]* (true)

Chemla (2011)

Psycholinguistic Perspectives

- Abrusàn (2016):

- Cognitive factives with non-presuppositional reading.
- Semantics and pragmatics of focus interact non-trivially with the presupposition generation process of many triggers.
- Focus sensitivity of triggering mechanism.

a. Now, if what you regret is having made the decision to shoot somebody, all this is going to sound a little foolish.

(Ian Percy, *The 7 Secrets to a Life of Meaning*, p. 91;
books.google.de/books?isbn=8120724410)

b. If what you regret is something negatively affecting another human, then apologize. (<https://uk.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20120108040902AA4mGOs>)

Opinion Mining

- Can we approach PSDs and their triggers using an approach that is informed by opinion mining?
 - Trigger
 - Opinion target
 - Opinion holder

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