

Semantic Theory: DRT III: Accessibility and Presuppositions


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
Anaphora and accessibility

- *Mary knows a professor. If she owns a book, he reads it. It fascinates him.*



Anaphora and accessibility

- *Mary knows a professor. If she owns a book, he reads it. **It** fascinates him.*



Accessible discourse referents

- The following discourse referents are accessible for a condition:
 - DRs in the same local DRS
 - DRs in a superordinate DRS
 - DRs on the top level of an antecedent DRS, if the condition occurs in the consequent DRS.



Accessible discourse referents

- Cases of non-accessibility:
 - *If a professor owns a book, he reads it. It has 300 pages.*
 - *It is not the case that a professor owns a book. He reads it.*
 - *Every professor owns a book. He reads it.*
 - *If every professor owns a book, he reads it.*
 - *Peter owns a book, or Mary reads it.*
 - *Peter owns a book, or Mary owns a CD. He hasn't read it yet.*



Subordination

- A DRS K_1 is an **immediate sub-DRS** of a DRS $K = \langle U_K, C_K \rangle$ iff C_K contains a condition of the form $\neg K_1, K_1 \Rightarrow K_2, K_2 \Rightarrow K_1, K_1 \vee K_2$ or $K_2 \vee K_1$.
- K_1 is a **sub-DRS** of K (notation: $K_1 \leq K$) iff
 - $K_1 = K$ or
 - K_1 is an immediate sub-DRS of K or
 - there is a DRS K_2 s.t. $K_2 \leq K_1$ and K_1 is an immediate sub-DRS of K .
 (i.e. reflexive, transitive closure)
- K_1 is a **proper sub-DRS** of K iff $K_1 \leq K$ and $K_1 \neq K$.



Accessibility

- Let K, K_1, K_2 be DRSES s.t. $K_1, K_2 \leq K, x \in U_{K_1}, \gamma \in C_{K_2}$
- x is **accessible** from γ in K iff
 - $K_2 \leq K_1$ or
 - there are $K_3, K_4 \leq K$ s.t. $K_1 \Rightarrow K_3 \in C_{K_4}$ and $K_2 \leq K_3$



Revised DRS Construction rule for Pronouns

- **Triggering Configuration:**
 - Let K^* be the main DRS that containing K
 - α a reducible condition in DRS K , containing $[_S [_{NP} \beta] [_{VP} \gamma]]$ or $[_{VP} [_V \gamma] [_{NP} \beta]]$ as substructure
 - β a personal pronoun.
- **Action:**
 - Add a new DR x to U_K .
 - Replace β in α by x .
 - Select an appropriate DR y that is accessible from α in K^* , and add $x = y$ to C_K .



DRS Construction Rule for Proper Names

- Triggering Configuration:
 - Let K^* be the main DRS that containing K
 - α a reducible condition in DRS K , containing $[_S [_{NP} \beta] [_{VP} \gamma]]$ or $[_{VP} [_V \gamma] [_{NP} \beta]]$ as substructure.
 - β a proper name
- Action:
 - Add a new DR x to U_{K^*} .
 - Replace β in α by x .
 - Add $x = \beta$ to C_{K^*} .



Is accessibility a truth-conditional property?

- *There is a book that John doesn't own.*
He wants to buy it.
- *John does not own every book.*
?He wants to buy it.
- *One of the ten balls is not in the bag.*
It must be under the sofa.
- *? Nine of the ten balls are in the bag.*
It must be under the sofa.



DRT is non-compositional

- DRT is **non-compositional** on truth conditions:
The different discourse-semantic status of the text pairs is not predictable through the (identical) truth conditions of its component sentences.
- Since structural information which cannot be reduced to truth conditions is required to compute the semantic value of texts, DRT is called a **representational theory of meaning**.



DRT: What about full definite NPs?

- So far, DRT models:
 - Indefinite NPs (*a professor*)
 - Pronouns as a sub-case of definite NPs (*he, she, it*)
 - Proper names (*John, Mary*)
- What about full definite NPs, or „definite descriptions“:
 - *the professor, the book*



Definite article in type-theoretic semantics

- Standard type-theoretic representation of definite article:

the $\Rightarrow \lambda F \lambda G \exists y (\forall x (F(x) \leftrightarrow x=y) \wedge G(y))$

the sun $\Rightarrow \lambda G \exists y (\forall x (sun'(x) \leftrightarrow x=y) \wedge G(y))$

the sun is shining \Rightarrow

$\exists y (\forall x (sun'(x) \leftrightarrow x=y) \wedge shine'(y))$

the student is working \Rightarrow

$\exists y (\forall x (student'(x) \leftrightarrow x=y) \wedge work'(y))$???

- Truth conditions – existence of one and only one student - are inadequate.



Issues for definite NPs in type theory

- There may be more than one reference object satisfying the description.
- What are the truth conditions in the case that there is no object satisfying the description?
 - *The king of France is bald*
 - *The greatest prime number is odd*
- Standard compositional computation of the semantics of complex objects does not work.



Definite Descriptions and Negation

- *It is not the case that the sun is shining*
- A straightforward compositional analysis of the sentence leads to
 - $\neg \exists x (\forall y (sun'(y) \leftrightarrow x=y) \wedge shine'(x))$
 - “Either there is no sun, or more than one, or there is exactly one sun, and it isn’t shining.”
- A better representation for the sentence:
 - $\exists x (\forall y (sun'(y) \leftrightarrow x=y) \wedge \neg shine'(x))$
 - “There is exactly one sun, and it isn’t shining.”



Definite Descriptions and Negation

- Only one part of the meaning representation is negated.
- The semantic material contributed by the descriptive part of the NP “survives”; it is projected upwards unchanged.
 - $\exists x (\forall y (chancellor'(y) \leftrightarrow x=y) \wedge \neg decides'(x))$
 - “There is exactly one chancellor, and he doesn’t decide.”



Similar projection phenomena

- The descriptive content of definite NPs survives not only negation, but also other kinds of embeddings
 - *The sun is shining, or it is dark outside*
 - >> *There is a sun, and it is shining or it is dark outside*
 - *It is possible that the student will work tomorrow.*
 - *Mary believes that John will pass the exam.*



The concept of Presupposition

- The semantic observations about definite noun phrases fit well to the general discourse-semantic view of context-meaning interaction.
- A sentence (containing a definite description) contains meaning information of two different types:
 - One specifies the requirements that the context must satisfy so the utterance can be interpreted at all.
 - The other one expresses the explicitly given additional information, in a certain context.
- We call the former the **presupposition**, the latter the **assertion**.



DRS Construction rule for definite NPs (First attempt)

- Triggering Configuration:
 - Let K^* be the main DRS that containing K
 - α is reducible condition in DRS K , containing $[_S[_{NP} \beta]]$ or $[_{VP}[_V \gamma] [_{NP} \beta]]$ as a substructure.
 - β is $\varepsilon\delta$, ε the definite article
- Action:
 - Add a new DR x to U_K .
 - Replace β in α by x .
 - Select an appropriate DR y that is accessible from α in K^* and satisfies δ , and add $x = y$ to C_K .



Presupposition

- Presupposition is a very general phenomenon in natural language: The projection behaviour under negation (and similar operators) is taken as a standard presupposition test - **Presupposition Triggers**
- The projection behaviour is more complex than the first guess definite NP rule suggests: **Cancellation and Filtering**
- The contribution of presupposition to the meaning of a discourse is not restricted to establishing the anaphoric link: **Accommodation**



Some Presupposition Triggers

- Definite noun phrases
 - *The sun is shining*
 - >> *There is sun* (and it is shining)
- Factive verbs
 - *John regrets that he has married.*
 - >> *John has married* (and he regrets that)
- Implicative verbs
 - *John forgot to close the door.*
 - >> *John intended to close the door* (but he forgot to do it)



Presupposition Triggers

- Aspect
 - *John has **stopped** smoking.*
 - >> *John used to smoke* (and he has stopped doing it)
 - *John opened the window **again**.*
 - >> *John had already opened the window before* (repetitive)
 - >> *The window was open before* (restitutive)
- Appositions / non-restrictive relative clauses.
 - *John, a good friend of mine, studies CL.*
 - *John, who is a good friend of mine, studies CL.*
 - >> *John is a good friend of mine* (and he studies CL).



Presupposition Triggers

- It-Clefts
 - *It was **John who** ate the cake.*
 - >> *Somebody ate the cake* (and it was John who did this)
- Focus particles
 - ***Only** John came to the party*
 - >> *John came to the party* (and nobody else did).



Presupposition Projection Again

- Presuppositions behave in a uniform way, in that they survive negation and various kinds of embeddings
 - *Either it will stop raining, **or** the match must be cancelled*
 - >> it is raining.
 - *John **possibly** regrets that he has married.*
 - >> John has married.
 - *Mary **believes** that John has stopped smoking.*
 - >> John used to smoke.



Presupposition Cancellation

- In the context of negation, presuppositions can be overwritten or “cancelled” by explicitly claiming that they are false:
- *The king of France isn't bald. France is a republic.*
- *John possibly regrets that he has married. But possibly, he hasn't married at all.*



Presupposition Filtering

- There are contexts that can “neutralise” or filter some presuppositions: they block projection of these presuppositions.
- *If John is out of town, then **his wife** is unhappy.*
– presupposes: John is married / has a wife
- *If John is married, then **his wife** is unhappy.*
– does not presuppose: John is married



Accomodation

- *The sun is shining.*
- *Sorry to be late. I couldn't start the car*
- *The king of Samoa will visit Germany in July.*
- Missing discourse referents + NP content can be „accomodated“, if it is not present in the context. Thus, presuppositions are not strict conditions on context, but also a device to convey additional information.



Presupposition phenomena: Wrap Up

- Presuppositions are **triggered** by a number of different words and linguistic constructions, including definite noun phrases.
- Presuppositions behave differently than assertions in semantics construction: They are typically **projected unchanged**, rather than used in functional application.
- Projected presuppositions can be **filtered** in the semantic composition process, and can be **cancelled** by contextual knowledge.
- Missing presuppositions can be accomodated.