

Semantic Theory

Lecture 2: Type theory

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Logic as a framework for NL semantics

- Approximate NL meaning as truth conditions.
- Logic supports precise, consistent and controlled meaning representation via truth-conditional interpretation.
- Logic provides deduction systems to model inference processes, controlled through a formal entailment concept.
- Logic supports uniform modelling of the semantic composition process.

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Outline

- A reminder: First-order predicate logic (FOL).
- The limits of FOL as a formalism for semantic representations.
- Type theory.
- Modal operators in logic.

Dolphins

Dolphins are mammals, not fish.

$\forall d (\text{dolphin}(d) \rightarrow \text{mammal}(d) \wedge \neg \text{fish}(d))$

Dolphins live in pods.

$\forall d (\text{dolphin}(d) \rightarrow \exists x (\text{pod}(p) \wedge \text{live-in}(d,p)))$

Dolphins give birth to one baby at a time.

$\forall d (\text{dolphin}(d) \rightarrow \forall x \forall y \forall t (\text{give-birth-to}(d,x,t) \wedge \text{give-birth-to}(d,y,t) \rightarrow x=y)$

Syntax of FOL [1]

- Non-logical expressions:
 - Individual constants: IC
 - n-place predicate symbols: RC^n ($n \geq 0$)
- Individual variables: IV
- Terms: $T = IV \cup IC$
- Atomic formulas:
 - $R(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ for $R \in RC^n$, if $t_1, \dots, t_n \in T$
 - $s=t$ for $s, t \in T$

Syntax of FOL [2]

- FOL formulas: The smallest set *For* such that:
 - All atomic formulas are in *For*
 - If A, B are in *For*, then so are $\neg A$, $(A \wedge B)$, $(A \vee B)$, $(A \rightarrow B)$, $(A \leftrightarrow B)$
 - If x is an individual variable and A is in *For*, then $\forall xA$ and $\exists xA$ are in *For*.

Dolphins in FOL

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Semantics of FOL [1]

- **Model structures** for FOL: $M = \langle U, V \rangle$
 - U (or U_M) is a non-empty **universe** (domain of individuals)
 - V (or V_M) is an **interpretation function**, which assigns individuals ($\in U_M$) to individual constants and n-ary relations between individuals ($\in U_M^n$) to n-place predicate symbols.
- **Assignment function** for variables $g: IV \rightarrow U_M$

Semantics of FOL [2]

- Interpretation of terms (with respect to a model structure M and a variable assignment g):

$[[\alpha]]^{M,g} = V_M(\alpha)$, if α is an individual constant

$[[\alpha]]^{M,g} = g(\alpha)$, if α is a variable

Semantics of FOL [3]

- Interpretation of formulas (with respect to model structure M and variable assignment g):

$$[[R(t_1, \dots, t_n)]]^{M,g} = 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad \langle [[t_1]]^{M,g}, \dots, [[t_n]]^{M,g} \rangle \in V_M(R)$$

$$[[s=t]]^{M,g} = 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad [[s]]^{M,g} = [[t]]^{M,g}$$

$$[[\neg\phi]]^{M,g} = 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad [[\phi]]^{M,g} = 0$$

$$[[\phi \wedge \psi]]^{M,g} = 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad [[\phi]]^{M,g} = 1 \text{ and } [[\psi]]^{M,g} = 1$$

$$[[\phi \vee \psi]]^{M,g} = 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad [[\phi]]^{M,g} = 1 \text{ or } [[\psi]]^{M,g} = 1$$

$$[[\phi \rightarrow \psi]]^{M,g} = 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad [[\phi]]^{M,g} = 0 \text{ or } [[\psi]]^{M,g} = 1$$

$$[[\phi \leftrightarrow \psi]]^{M,g} = 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad [[\phi]]^{M,g} = [[\psi]]^{M,g}$$

$$[[\exists x\phi]]^{M,g} = 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{there is } a \in U_M \text{ such that } [[\phi]]^{M,g[x/a]} = 1$$

$$[[\forall x\phi]]^{M,g} = 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{for all } a \in U_M : [[\phi]]^{M,g[x/a]} = 1$$

- $g[x/a]$ is the variable assignment which is identical with g except that it assigns the individual a to the variable x .

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Semantics of FOL [4]

- Formula A is **true in the model structure M** iff $[[A]]^{M,g} = 1$ for every variable assignment g . This works best if A has no free variables.
- A model structure M **satisfies** a set of formulas Γ (or: M is a **model** of Γ) iff every formula $A \in \Gamma$ is true in M .
- A is **valid** iff A is true in all model structures.
- A is **satisfiable** iff there is a model structure that makes it true.
- A is **unsatisfiable** iff there is no model structure that makes it true.
- A is **contingent** iff it is satisfiable but not valid.

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Entailment and Deduction

- A set of formulas Γ **entails** formula A ($\Gamma \models A$) iff A is true in every model of Γ .
- A (sound and complete) **calculus** for FOL allows us to **prove** A from Γ iff $\Gamma \models A$ by manipulating the formulas syntactically. There are many calculi for FOL: resolution, tableaux, natural deduction, ...
- Calculi can be implemented to obtain:
 - theorem provers: check entailment, validity, and unsatisfiability
 - model builders: check satisfiability, compute models
 - model checkers: determine whether model satisfies formula
 - find off-the-shelf implementations on the Internet

Two levels of interpretation

- Semantic interpretation of a NL expression in a logical framework is a two-step process:
 - The NL expression is assigned a semantic representation
 - The semantic representation is truth-conditionally interpreted.

The expressive power of FOL [1]

John is a blond criminal

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$\text{criminal}(j) \wedge \text{blond}(j)$

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The expressive power of FOL [1]

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John is an honest criminal

$\text{criminal}(j) \wedge \text{honest}(j)$?

John is an alleged criminal

$\text{criminal}(j) \wedge \text{alleged}(j)$??

The expressive power of FOL [2]

John is driving fast

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$\text{drive}(j) \wedge \text{fast}(j)$

The expressive power of FOL [2]

John is driving fast

$\text{drive}(j) \wedge \text{fast}(j)$

John is eating fast

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$\text{eat}(j) \wedge \text{fast}(j)$??

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$\text{drive}(j) \wedge \text{fast}(j)$

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$\text{eat}(j) \wedge \text{fast}(j)$??

John is driving very fast.

The expressive power of FOL [2]

John is driving fast

$\text{drive}(j) \wedge \text{fast}(j)$

John is eating fast

$\text{eat}(j) \wedge \text{fast}(j)$??

John is driving very fast.

???

The expressive power of FOL [3]

It rains.

It rained yesterday.

It rains occasionally.

Bill is blond. Blond is a hair colour. (≠ Bill is a hair colour.)

Type theory

- The types of non-logical expressions provided by FOL – terms and n-ary first-order relations – are not sufficient to describe the semantic function of all natural language expressions.
- Type theory provides a much richer inventory of types – higher-order relations and functions of different kinds.

Types

- For NL meaning representation the (minimal) set of **basic types** is $\{e, t\}$:
 - e (for entity) is the type of individual terms
 - t (for truth value) is the type of formulas
- All pairs $\langle \sigma, \tau \rangle$ made up of (basic or complex) types σ, τ are types. $\langle \sigma, \tau \rangle$ is the type of functions which map arguments of type σ to values of type τ .
- In short: The set of types is the smallest set \mathbf{T} such that $e, t \in \mathbf{T}$, and if $\sigma, \tau \in \mathbf{T}$, then also $\langle \sigma, \tau \rangle \in \mathbf{T}$.

Some useful complex types for NL semantics

- Individual: e
- Sentence: t
- One-place predicate constant: $\langle e, t \rangle$
- Two-place relation: $\langle e, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$
- Sentence adverbial: $\langle t, t \rangle$
- Attributive adjective: $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$
- Degree modifier: $\langle \langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle, \langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle \rangle$

Second-order predicates

- *Bill is blond. Blond is a hair colour:*
 - Bill is represented as a term of type e .
 - "blond" is represented as a term of type $\langle e, t \rangle$.
 - "hair colour" is represented as a term of type $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle$.
 - "*Bill is a hair colour*" is not even a well-formed statement.

Some useful complex types for NL semantics

- Individual: e
- Sentence: t
- One-place predicate constant: $\langle e, t \rangle$
- Two-place relation: $\langle e, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$
- Sentence adverbial: $\langle t, t \rangle$
- Attributive adjective: $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$
- Degree modifier: $\langle \langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle, \langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle \rangle$
- Second-order predicate: $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle$

Type-theoretic syntax [1]

- Vocabulary:
 - Possibly empty, pairwise disjoint sets of **non-logical constants**: Con_τ for every type τ

Higher-order variables

- *Bill has the same hair colour as John.*
- *Santa Claus has all the attributes of a sadist.*

Type-theoretic syntax [1]

- Vocabulary:
 - Possibly empty, pairwise disjoint sets of **non-logical constants**: Con_τ for every type τ
 - Infinite and pairwise disjoint sets of **variables**: Var_τ for every type τ
 - The logical operators known from FOL.

Type-theoretic syntax [2]

- The sets of well-formed expressions WE_τ for every type τ are given by:
 - $Con_\tau \subseteq WE_\tau$ for every type τ
 - If $\alpha \in WE_{\langle \sigma, \tau \rangle}$, $\beta \in WE_\sigma$, then $\alpha(\beta) \in WE_\tau$.
 - If A, B are in WE_t , then so are $\neg A$, $(A \wedge B)$, $(A \vee B)$, $(A \rightarrow B)$, $(A \leftrightarrow B)$
 - If A is in WE_t , then so are $\forall vA$ and $\exists vA$, where v is a variable of arbitrary type.
 - If α, β are well-formed expressions of the same type, then $\alpha = \beta \in WE_t$.

Building well-formed expressions

Bill drives fast.

drive: <e,t> fast: <<e,t>,<e,t>>

Bill: e fast(drive): <e,t>

fast(drive)(bill): t

Mary works in Saarbrücken

mary: e work: <e,t> in: <e,<t,t>> sb: e

work(mary): t in(sb): <t,t>

in(sb)(work(mary)): t

More examples

- *Blond is a hair colour.*
- *Santa Claus has all the attributes of a sadist.*

Type-theoretic semantics [1]

- Let U be a non-empty set of entities.
- The **domain of possible denotations** D_τ for every type τ is given by:
 - $D_e = U$
 - $D_t = \{0, 1\}$
 - $D_{\langle \sigma, \tau \rangle}$ is the set of all functions from D_σ to D_τ

Type-theoretic semantics [2]

- A **model structure** for a type theoretic language:
 $M = \langle U, V \rangle$, where
 - U (or U_M) is a non-empty domain of individuals
 - V (or V_M) is an interpretation function, which assigns to every member of Con_τ an element of D_τ .
- **Variable assignment** g assigns every variable of type τ a member of D_τ .

Type-theoretic semantics [3]

Interpretation (with respect to model structure M and variable assignment g):

$$[[\alpha]]^{M,g} = V_M(\alpha), \text{ if } \alpha \text{ constant}$$

$$[[\alpha]]^{M,g} = g(\alpha), \text{ if } \alpha \text{ variable}$$

$$[[\alpha(\beta)]]^{M,g} = [[\alpha]]^{M,g}([[\beta]]^{M,g})$$

$$[[\neg\varphi]]^{M,g} = 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad [[\varphi]]^{M,g} = 0$$

$$[[\varphi \wedge \psi]]^{M,g} = 1 \quad \text{iff} \quad [[\varphi]]^{M,g} = 1 \text{ and } [[\psi]]^{M,g} = 1, \text{ etc.}$$

$$\text{If } v \in \text{Var}_\tau, [[\exists v\varphi]]^{M,g} = 1 \text{ iff there is } a \in D_\tau \text{ such that } [[\varphi]]^{M,g[v/a]} = 1$$

$$\text{If } v \in \text{Var}_\tau, [[\forall v\varphi]]^{M,g} = 1 \text{ iff for all } a \in D_\tau : [[\varphi]]^{M,g[v/a]} = 1$$

$$[[\alpha=\beta]]^{M,g} = 1 \text{ iff } [[\alpha]]^{M,g} = [[\beta]]^{M,g}$$

Type theory

- The definition of the syntax and semantics of type theory is a straightforward extension of FOL.
- Words like "satisfies", "valid", "satisfiable", "entailment" carry over almost verbatim from FOL.
- Type theory is sometimes called "higher-order logic":
 - first-order logic allows quantification over individual variables (type e)
 - second-order logic allows quantification over variables of type $\langle \sigma, \tau \rangle$ where σ and τ are atomic
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Currying

- All functional types are interpreted as one-place functions.
- How do we deal with functions/relations with multiple arguments?
- Currying ("Schönfinkeln"):
 - simulate term $P(a,b)$ as the term $P(a)(b)$
 - simulate type $\langle e \times e, t \rangle$ as the type $\langle e, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$.

Summary

- First-order logic is nice, but its expressive power has limits that are not acceptable in NL semantics:
 - modification
 - modification of modifiers
 - higher-order properties
- Type theory is a generalisation of first-order logic that allows us to represent the semantics of all these expressions.